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EFFECTS OF UNIONIZATION ON GRADUATE 
STUDENT EMPLOYEES: FACULTY–STUDENT 
RELATIONS, ACADEMIC FREEDOM, AND PAY
SEAN E. ROGERS, ADRIENNE E. EATON, AND PAULA B. VOOS*
In cases involving unionization of graduate student research and 
teaching assistants at private U.S. universities, the National Labor 
Relations Board has, at times, denied collective bargaining rights on 
the presumption that unionization would harm faculty–student rela-
tions and academic freedom. Using survey data collected from 
PhD students in five academic disciplines across eight public U.S. 
universities, the authors compare represented and non-represented 
graduate student employees in terms of faculty–student relations, 
academic freedom, and pay. Unionization does not have the pre-
sumed negative effect on student outcomes, and in some cases has a 
positive effect. Union-represented graduate student employees re-
port higher levels of personal and professional support, unionized 
graduate student employees fare better on pay, and unionized and 
nonunionized students report similar perceptions of academic free-
dom. These findings suggest that potential harm to faculty–student 
relationships and academic freedom should not continue to serve as 
bases for the denial of collective bargaining rights to graduate stu-
dent employees.
In its 2004 Brown University decision, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) rejected extending collective bargaining rights to graduate stu-
dent assistants at private universities. The NLRB argued that graduate stu-
dent assistants were primarily students and thus not statutory employees, 
the student–university relationship was not analogous to the traditional em-
ployee–employer relationship, and extending collective bargaining rights to 
graduate student assistants would threaten the quality of student–teacher 
relationships and “infringe upon traditional academic freedoms” (Brown 
University 2004: 490). Interestingly, the dissenting Board members con- 
tended that the latter argument was not “supported by empirical evidence 
*Sean E. Rogers is a PhD candidate in the School of Management and Labor Relations at Rutgers
University and a Visiting Assistant Professor in the Anderson School of Management at University of New 
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of any kind” (Brown University 2004: 499), a criticism the majority re- 
jected.
In this article we examine the impact of collective bargaining on the qual-
ity of student–teacher relationships and on academic freedom in light of 
this need for empirical evidence. Previous work has studied this issue 
through surveys of faculty experiences with, and attitudes toward, student 
collective bargaining (Hewitt 2000) and through interviews with graduate 
student union representatives and university officials (Julius and Gumport 
2003), whereas ours is the first to directly compare the experiences and per-
ceptions of unionized and nonunionized graduate student employees 
(GSEs). Besides analyzing the impact of collective bargaining on student–
teacher relationships and academic freedom—two aspects of doctoral edu-
cation the Brown Board argued would be damaged by graduate student 
unionization—we also evaluate differences in the economic well-being of 
unionized and nonunionized graduate student employees. We frame our 
research with relevant theories from the industrial relations tradition. Of 
necessity, our analysis uses data from the public rather than the private sec-
tor. Nonetheless, our findings add insight into the graduate student collec-
tive bargaining debate.
Graduate Student Collective Bargaining 
and the NLRB: A Brief Review
Historically in the United States, graduate research and teaching assistants 
at private universities have been prevented from bargaining collectively. In 
1972 when the American Association of University Professors sought to rep-
resent several work units at Adelphi University, including full-time and part-
time faculty, librarians, department chairs and program directors, and 
graduate teaching and research assistants, the NLRB ruled against the inclu-
sion of graduate student employees in the petitioner’s bargaining unit, cit-
ing that they were “primarily students” (640). Two years later, when a group 
of PhD student research assistants at Stanford University petitioned for col-
lective representation, the NLRB dismissed their petition using the Adelphi 
case logic of research assistants being primarily students, and added that the 
relationship between the assistants and Stanford did not reflect the stan-
dard employer–employee relationship.
Such thinking on the part of NLRB members carried over to subsequent 
cases involving hospital “housestaff,” which included medical interns, resi-
dents, and clinical fellows who had already earned their MD degrees but 
were engaged in graduate medical practice and education required to be-
come licensed and certified for medical practice. In two separate cases 
(Cedars-Sinai Medical Center 1976, and St. Clare’s Hospital and Health 
Center 1977), the NLRB ruled against housestaff collective bargaining 
rights. In addition to finding that medical internships and residencies are 
an integral component of the graduate educational process, the Board also 
contended that collective bargaining would be detrimental to student–teacher 
relationships and would “infringe upon traditional academic freedoms” 
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(1002). As an example of the latter, the Board noted that the “notoriously 
long hours” residents and interns work, which “from a strictly educational 
standpoint . . . may be necessary in order to provide students with as broad 
an experience as possible,” could become bargainable if housestaff were al-
lowed to become part of a bargaining unit, and this could hamper the “flex-
ibility which medical educators need to schedule shifts . . . in an educationally 
sound fashion” (1002).
More than two decades following the string of cases from Adelphi to St. 
Clare’s, the NLRB reversed its position on housestaff and graduate research 
and teaching assistants. In a 1999 decision involving housestaff at Boston 
Medical Center, the Board rejected the “primarily students” conceptualiza-
tion, arguing that the categories “student” and “employee” need not be mu-
tually exclusive, and that students who also performed the duties of an 
employee could be covered and protected under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. They also rejected the earlier Board’s speculation about collective 
bargaining’s deleterious impact on student–teacher relationships and aca-
demic freedom, citing that nothing of the sort had occurred at the numer-
ous public universities where graduate students were currently organized. 
In 2000, the NLRB made a similar ruling involving graduate research and 
teaching assistants at New York University (NYU), allowing students at pri-
vate universities to organize and collectively bargain for the first time. These 
two rulings were made by a Board in which nominees of Democratic Presi-
dent William Clinton held a majority.
In 2004, Brown University challenged the NYU ruling, arguing that grad-
uate students should not be considered employees covered by the National 
Labor Relations Act, and that a student’s relationship with his or her faculty 
and university is not analogous to the standard employer–employee rela-
tionship. A majority of the now Republican-dominated NLRB agreed and 
overturned the NYU decision, concluding that it “was wrongly decided” 
(483). In their decision, it recanted the Clinton Board’s rejection of argu-
ments about the potentially deleterious effect of collective bargaining on 
the graduate student educational process, student–teacher relationships, 
and academic freedom. In response to claims that public universities with 
organized graduate students did not face such realities and that the Board 
majority was making its decision “in the absence of empirical evidence,” the 
majority responded that “even if some unions have chosen not to intrude 
into academic prerogatives, that does not mean that other unions would be 
similarly abstemious” (492) and that “25 years of untroubled experience 
under pre-NYU standards [is a] sound empirical basis” (493).
Previous Research on the Consequences 
of Graduate Student Unionization
Given the centrality of the claims about the impact of GSE unionization 
to legal rationales for denying bargaining rights, that so little empirical evi-
dence exists for those claims is of concern. Only two studies have attempted 
to systematically assess what impact GSE unionization has on aspects of the 
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graduate educational process, including student–teacher relationships and 
academic freedom. Hewitt (2000) surveyed liberal arts and sciences faculty at 
five large doctoral-granting public universities about their attitudes toward 
graduate student collective bargaining. He found overwhelming evidence that 
faculty members did not perceive collective bargaining to be deleterious to 
educational processes. Ninety-five percent of respondents felt that collective 
bargaining did not inhibit the free exchange of ideas (which may well be 
thought of as a key element of academic freedom). More than 90% of faculty 
members did not believe graduate student collective bargaining inhibited 
their own ability to advise or instruct their graduate students, and 88% felt that 
collective bargaining did not negatively impact the mentoring relationships 
between them and their graduate students. Hewitt concluded that graduate 
student collective bargaining did not appear to interfere with faculty mem-
bers’ abilities to advise, instruct, and mentor their students, and suggested that 
the findings refute claims to the contrary made by university administrators.
Through interviews with college administrators and graduate student 
union representatives, and through archival analysis of graduate student 
collective bargaining agreements, Julius and Gumport (2003) sought to ex-
amine “to what extent, if any, has graduate student unionization affected 
the student-mentor relationship” (188). From their analysis of 50 interviews 
and all existing collective bargaining agreements that covered graduate re-
search or teaching assistants, they concluded: “Although we are concerned 
that collective bargaining among graduate students may change the nu-
ances of pedagogical relationships between faculty and students, our data 
provided no such evidence” (209). They further contended: “Fears that 
[collective bargaining] will undermine mentoring relationships . . . appear 
to be foundationless” (209).
Our research contributes to this literature by examining the issues from 
the point of view of GSEs themselves. We examine two issues at the core of 
the legal debate described above—the impact of unionization on faculty–
student relations and on academic freedom. We also consider a third issue, 
not frequently discussed in the legal literature but presumably of central 
importance to graduate student employees themselves, that is, the impact of 
unionization on pay and benefits. We turn now to considering what social 
science theory might suggest about each of these relationships.
Faculty–Student Relationships and Pluralist 
Industrial Relations Theory
Industrial relations theory is often viewed as “adversarial,” because it asserts 
there are some inherent conflicts of interest in the labor–management rela-
tionship, in addition to similarities of interest.1 Some observers have taken 
1Walton and McKersie (1965) develop the theory of how this can lead to integrative as well as distribu-
tive bargaining given that bargaining between employers and employees is an exercise in mixed motive 
decision-making. See Budd and Bhave (2008) for a discussion of the history of this idea in pluralist indus-
trial relations theory.
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this structural observation about institutional relationships between the par-
ties to mean that interpersonal relationships among managers and lower-
level employees are hostile—or at best arms-length—in the context of 
unionization. For instance, Mahoney and Watson (1999) argue that under 
collective bargaining:
The parties are cast as having divergent interests and negotiations take the 
form of distributive bargaining. The exchange is cast in terms of simple eco-
nomic exchange with no pretense of a social exchange. Of necessity, collective 
bargaining addresses those issues which can feasibly be contracted: hours of 
work, pay, bases for job assignment, and the like. Open-ended trust and unde-
fined reciprocal obligations which characterize social exchange cannot be con-
tracted. (157)
This view of social relations in a unionized workplace is clearly a caricature; 
however, it is one that seems to have influenced the Brown decision.
Social exchange, of course, continues to be important in organized work-
places in the day-to-day relationships that are integral to the successful coor-
dination of groups of people working together. Reciprocal obligations and 
friendships do matter, even between the managed and the manager, al-
though also true is that sometimes the interests of the two conflict (Dahren-
dorf 1959). After all, a first-level supervisor cannot be successful unless he 
or she somehow encourages lower-level employees to cooperate with one 
another and work productively; managers depend on those who work for 
them to be successful. This is just as true in a union workplace as it is in a 
nonunion one, and line managers are key players in a social exchange pro-
cess. In short, pluralist IR theory would view the day-to-day relationships 
between workers and employers and managers as reflecting the overall 
“mixed motive” nature of the employment relationship. While conflict is 
inherent, it is also limited because, as Kochan writes (1998: 37–38): “Indus-
trial relations theory starts from the assumption that an enduring conflict of 
interests exists between workers and employers in employment relation-
ships. . . . Pluralists . . . view the conflict as partial in nature.”
This theory is related to an empirical tradition of research termed “dual 
loyalty.” These studies, mostly done in the 1950s, demonstrated that workers 
were often loyal simultaneously to both their union and their employer 
(see, for instance, Dean 1954; Angle and Perry 1986; or for a thorough re-
view and critique, Gordon and Ladd 1990). Most workers continue to care 
about their jobs and want to do their jobs well, whether or not they are rep-
resented by a union. They are also loyal to both their union and their im-
mediate work group (see Kuhn 1961, who explores the interaction of the 
two in a study of grievances). And interestingly, first-level supervisors often 
exhibit a somewhat different form of mixed loyalty—both to the workgroup 
and its norms, and to the orders that come from above in the enterprise 
(Doeringer and Piore 1971: 37). Mixed loyalty exists for many employees in 
large organizations, including college professors themselves. Pluralist indus-
trial relations theory acknowledges that while employees have somewhat 
 different interests from other employees, they are at the same time all em-
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ployees and all should be accorded the opportunity to have union represen-
tation, with the exception of some groups of managerial executives.
The degree to which employee interests are similar or diverge is the core 
issue in the matter of whether employees have enough similarity of interest 
to be in the same bargaining unit or whether different units are appropri-
ate. For this reason, first-level supervisors are often in a different bargaining 
unit from lower-level employees in those states in which they have represen-
tation rights. Whether faculty members and graduate student employees 
have largely similar interests or a sufficient number of divergent interests to 
be in the same bargaining unit is an empirical matter, not a theoretical one.
Gross (2006), reflecting on his experience as a graduate student em-
ployee during an organizing drive at University of California-Davis and as a 
postdoc during a campus strike, provides valuable insight on these issues in 
the university campus context. In trying to avoid unionization, the UC ad-
ministration made the same legal arguments that prevailed in Brown. The 
administration made “rhetoric[al] attempts to draw a sharp line between 
collective bargaining, presented as an antagonistic relation between em-
ployer and employee, and the campus community, embodied in the colle-
gial relation between mentor and apprentice” (345). Instead, employees 
themselves viewed the campus as a community of employees, including ones 
who are also students (Gross: 337). Professors viewed themselves as part of 
this community of instructors, rather than considering themselves “manage-
ment.” The dividing line between management and labor in universities is 
drawn around economic issues, not day-to-day workplace matters, so union-
ization of GSEs should not undermine relationships with the faculty.2
Faculty–Student Relationships and Internal Labor Market Theory
A body of theory in industrial relations speaks directly to mentoring rela-
tionships in the workplace. Internal labor market (ILM) theory (Doeringer 
and Piore 1971) is particularly useful for understanding the potential im-
pact of GSE unions on the academic relationship between professors and 
graduate students. The portion of ILM theory that has been most influen-
tial concerns the economic efficiency of an ILM for an individual employer 
with considerable firm-specific human capital. Well-established ports of 
entry, job ladders, and the use of both formal and informal internal training 
in this context minimize training and turnover costs. Custom, and employee 
acceptance of the fairness of these policies, helps maintain the ILM.
A second part of ILM theory concerns craft labor markets, like those in 
the building trades, where fully trained and skilled employees ultimately 
work for a variety of employers, within the same craft or trade. Employee 
2Also worth noting is that the California Public Employment Relations Board, as part of a finding in 
favor of employee status for GSEs, concluded, “After 71 days of formal hearing, involving approximately 
200 witnesses, there is simply no credible evidence in this record to support a finding that mentor rela-
tionships will deteriorate if the students in question are found to be employees” (quoted in Gross 2006: 
338).
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organizations, as well as employers, often play a role in structuring and 
maintaining these arrangements. Professional associations, like unions, may 
play this role.
In some respects, academic labor markets are similar to those of the 
skilled trades, with PhD student employees being analogous to apprentices 
(Gross 2006). Like apprentices, PhD students are learning a skilled profes-
sion (trade) both through formal classroom study and through a series of 
work experiences as teaching assistants and research assistants that will ulti-
mately result in their being certified as a broadly skilled professional (crafts-
person). Like apprentices, they are working (and producing goods and 
services) at the same time they are learning to teach and to conduct re-
search.
Research methods are often the subject of formal instruction but research 
knowledge becomes complete when deepened with experience on actual 
research projects that impart experiential knowledge about the research 
and publication process. Research skills grow over the course of a PhD pro-
gram as students work as assistants on professors’ research projects. They 
also engage in a series of increasingly complex research projects of their 
own, culminating in a PhD thesis and (typically) published papers. Both 
types of work build research skills, but obviously, time spent working on pro-
fessors’ research projects can also interfere with a student’s own research.
Teaching skills are somewhat different from research. Little (if any) class-
room instruction is provided with regard to teaching in higher education 
although one can argue that by having been a student, most PhD students 
have observed a range of more or less successful instructional techniques. 
Typically, PhD students initially learn to be college instructors by being paid 
teaching assistants, working under the direction of a professor to grade pa-
pers and perhaps conduct a discussion section paired with the larger lecture 
being conducted by the professor. Often, they are observed while teaching 
in this context. Later, they may go on to instruct smaller classes on their 
own—and in the process may have working conditions that are quite similar 
to those of adjunct instructors or the part-time lecturers (PTLs) that form a 
low-cost pool of labor at many universities. All this prepares them for future 
work as a college professor with its combination of teaching, research, and 
service responsibilities. But all this also is time-consuming and if the teach-
ing obligations of GSEs are too onerous, they can interfere with successful 
completion of the PhD.
In the internal labor market (ILM) that characterizes higher education, 
as in other craft ILMs, fully skilled journeymen (professors) are willing to 
impart their professional skills and accumulated knowledge of how to be a 
successful researcher or a successful teacher because they are assured that 
the internal labor market will prevent them from being replaced by their 
younger colleague. As Doeringer and Piore (1971) discuss, “The desire to 
demonstrate, or ‘show off,’ skills to others is operative only when such trans-
mission of skills does not pose an economic threat to the ‘teacher’” (31). 
Professors, of course, are in the education business and their ethical obligation 
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(termed “custom” in ILM theory) is one of building on the natural teach-
ing/learning process and consciously mentoring PhD students to become 
excellent all-around members of the academic craft. Further, academic repu-
tations, particularly for senior faculty members, are often built on one’s suc-
cess in sending well-prepared PhD graduates into the academic labor market.
The mentoring relationship is also essential to the success of the graduate 
student’s career, not only in obtaining a job but also in becoming successful 
researchers and teachers. It hardly makes sense, then, that a union repre-
senting GSEs would pursue policies that would alienate GSEs from their 
mentors.
When viewed through this theoretical frame, it becomes apparent that, 
contra Brown, there is no reason why union representation of GSEs, profes-
sors, or both should damage the professor–PhD student relationship. If any-
thing, it may strengthen the relationship by formalizing the customary 
ethics of the relationship; that is, by keeping the apprentice from being ex-
ploited by the employer and from being worked more than is appropriate in 
economic production at the expense of learning the trade.
Academic Freedom and Exit/Voice Theory
Academic freedom is a core value in higher education—of enormous con-
cern to both faculty and to the institutions that employ them. The American 
Association of University Professors (AAUP), which was founded to defend 
academic freedom, defines it in this way: “It encompasses the right of faculty 
to full freedom in research and in the publication of results, freedom in the 
classroom in discussing their subject, and the right of faculty to be free from 
institutional censorship or discipline when they speak or write as citizens” 
(AAUP 2007). AAUP focuses on individual rights to academic freedom. The 
Association of American Colleges and Universities also recognizes the im-
portance of academic freedom, asserting that “academic freedom to ex-
plore significant and controversial questions is an essential precondition to 
fulfill the academy’s mission of educating students and advancing knowl-
edge” (Association of American Colleges and Universities 2006: 1). The aca-
demic freedom of professors has been of primary concern, although 
students too should be accorded “freedom to express their ideas publicly as 
well as repeated opportunities to explore a wide range of insights and per-
spectives” (ibid.: 5). Graduate student employees thus deserve academic 
freedom both as students and as developing scholars in their teaching and 
research endeavors.
This academic freedom relates to the concept of voice in employment re-
lations theory. Freeman and Medoff (1979) contend that unions have two 
faces, that of monopoly (raising compensation) but also that of collective 
voice. The union is a vehicle for communicating employee concerns to 
management and for promoting change desired by a majority of mem-
bers—the political voice function of unions is an alternative to exit, which is 
the process in a nonunion context whereby individual employees would 
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express dissatisfaction with employment conditions by quitting their jobs. 
Unions also promote individual voice in the workplace by protecting indi-
vidual employees from discipline or discharge except for just cause. The 
collective voice of all employees, as expressed through the union that nego-
tiates on their behalf, stands behind the provision of justice to individual 
employees through the just cause provision of contracts and the grievance 
procedures that back them up.
Professional unions typically view voice as extending beyond terms and 
conditions of employment to protection of the standards or ethics of the 
particular profession. Nursing unions, for instance, claim they are guard-
ians of patient care standards and of nurses exercising voice in defense of 
those standards.3 From this point of view, union representation may, if any-
thing, enhance perceptions of academic freedom on the part of GSEs them-
selves. The two are highly compatible.
Nonetheless, graduate student unionization could somehow reduce the 
academic freedom of faculty or of the institution through negotiations over 
academic policy—grades, course requirements, and the like. None of these 
matters would be mandatory subjects of bargaining, and most universities 
would be loath to negotiate over them as permissive subjects, but universities 
have argued that this is a potential consequence of GSE unionization. Lafer, 
who researched this in 2003, was unable to find any examples of GSE unions 
negotiating over these issues.4 As discussed above, Hewitt found that faculty 
did not perceive GSE unionization as inhibiting the free exchange of ideas. 
This concern strikes us as unfounded, absent evidence, but others will have 
to investigate the matter. In this study we will explore the impact on the aca-
demic freedom of graduate students themselves, and on their perception of 
overall academic freedom in the institution but not specifically the academic 
freedom of faculty who work with them or the institution in which they work.
Impact on Pay/Benefits
U.S. unions typically raise wages; however, measured union wage effects are 
somewhat lower in the public sector (where our universities are all located) 
than in the private sector (Blanchflower and Bryson 2004). Some of the 
 difference appears to be explained by public-sector workers being more 
 educated and more often white collar than average (Bahrami, Bitzan, and 
Leitch 2009).
Earlier studies of the degree to which unionization raises university profes-
sors’ salaries are somewhat mixed (Ashraf 1997; Monks 2000) but most 
3National Nurses United, for instance, describes its Nursing Practice Department as being “responsi-
ble for promoting excellence in nursing practice, protecting the art and science of nursing in the work-
place and promoting patient advocacy” (http://www.nationalnursesunited.org/pages/nursing-practice). 
Similarly, the tagline for the New York State Nurses Association is “Advocating for Patients. Advancing the 
Profession.”
4In a quick overview of the collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the unions included in our 
study, we found they included, in addition to salary and in some cases benefits, the following topics: 
health and safety, workload, appointment procedures, evaluations, workspace, work/family issues, and 
grievance procedures.
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report small positive effects. Hedrick, Henson, Krieg, and Wassell (2011) 
point out that one measurement error problem plaguing these studies is that 
they code faculty at a university as union when any of four groups are orga-
nized—full-time permanent faculty, part-time permanent faculty, adjuncts, and 
librarians—whereas often only some of these groups have representation. 
Their recent panel data–based study corrected for this measurement error 
and controlled for the cost of living, since many faculty unions are located in 
high cost-of-living states. They still find small, positive, and significant effects, 
albeit larger ones if cost-of-living controls are not included. Other research 
indicates that pay satisfaction is greater among unionized faculty than among 
those who are not represented (Wickens 2008). Represented faculty perceive 
themselves to be better off along economic dimensions.
None of these studies of faculty include GSEs who teach or do research 
(TAs and RAs). A true paucity of studies address the question of whether 
GSE unions are able to raise pay or otherwise improve economic outcomes 
for their members. An early study that examined average TA stipends by 
date of unionization revealed little impact of unions on compensation 
(Ehrenberg, Klaff, Kezsborn, and Nagowski 2002). A more recent study 
(Schenk 2010) reports that GSE unions with contracts do increase stipends 
(direct pay), but they have no statistically significant impact on total com-
pensation. Schenk’s regression includes many controls, including ones for 
the cost of living. Schenk’s study was based on data collected by the Chronicle 
of Higher Education for 2000–01, 2001–02, and 2003–04 for departmental av-
erages supplied by the departments of biology, economics, English, me-
chanical engineering, and sociology. According to these data, unions do not 
reduce pay inequality across departments.
These studies led us to anticipate that union-represented GSEs would 
have somewhat higher pay than those who were not represented, just as rep-
resented faculty and public-sector workers more generally, have somewhat 
higher pay than non-represented employees. However, it seems likely that 
the difference in pay will not be large.
Methods
The empirical assertions that we test in this article are not derived from the 
industrial relations theories reviewed above; rather, our primary aim was to 
test 30-plus years of NLRB “theory” concerning the impact of GSE unioniza-
tion on student and institutional outcomes. As such, this article does not 
focus on thorough explanations for a single dependent variable; rather, we 
are primarily concerned with the impact of a single independent variable 
(unionization) on multiple dependent variables. We extracted theory from 
NLRB rulings that, despite a total lack of empirical support, have  denied 
GSEs in the private sector collective bargaining rights for three decades.5 
Hence, we examine whether there is empirical support for the view that 
representation of GSEs harms the faculty–student relationship or hurts 
5Three decades minus the brief interlude during which the Clinton Board’s contrary reasoning held sway.
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academic freedom from the employee’s perspective. Our own theoretical 
frame leads us to suspect the hypotheses advanced by the opponents of GSE 
unionization. Rather, we anticipate finding either a positive or no relation-
ship of unionization on the faculty–student relationship and on student per-
ceptions of academic freedom; we hypothesize a small positive relationship 
of unionization on economic outcomes. Testing a hypothesis of “no rela-
tionship” is not possible, so we use power analysis to be sure our sample is 
statistically large enough to find support for the negative hypotheses about 
union effects stemming from the legal tradition, if in fact they are correct.
We conducted a survey of graduate students from four unionized and 
four nonunion public universities. While a random sample of all graduate 
students or all graduate student employees in the United States might have 
been more desirable, it was not feasible. Rather, we chose a design that was 
feasible and that controls for certain aspects of institutional variation in-
cluding region, size, and discipline. The eight universities included in the 
study consisted of four sets of matched pairs, one union and one nonunion 
university for each geographic region of the United States (West, Midwest, 
Northeast, and South). To control for possible variation due to the particu-
lar union involved, we included universities whose GSEs were represented 
by affiliates of a single national union. All of the collective bargaining rela-
tionships are long-standing, dating from 1983 or before. We chose the union 
universities first and then sought nonunion matches based on size as mea-
sured by total number of students (average of 35,000 in 2007) and research 
budget (average of $453 million in 2007). By design, we did not include any 
nonunion university with an active GSE organizing campaign. All eight uni-
versities in our sample have Carnegie Classifications as research universities 
with very high research activity (“RU/VH”; commonly referred to as “R1”), 
and six of the eight institutions are members of the Association of American 
Universities (AAU). In terms of Carnegie Classification, these universities 
mirror the private universities that have been subject to NLRB decision-
making (Brown, NYU) and that have also seen the most concentrated orga-
nizing activity (for example, University of Pennsylvania).6 Because most 
universities are unwilling (or unable, given privacy issues) to furnish outsid-
ers with complete lists of graduate students, we chose instead to focus on a 
subset of large departments representing a range of attitudes toward union-
ization as well as disciplinary variety (humanities, social science, professional 
school, and STEM [science, technology, engineering, math]): English, com-
puter science, business, psychology, and history.7 For most departments, we 
were able to obtain the list of graduate students and their e-mail addresses 
directly from a departmental website. For one department in one university, 
6Coverage of recent private university organizing drives, including at the University of Pennsylvania, 
can be found at http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2009/01/28/union.
7At one university where we were able to obtain the total number of GSEs by department and indi-
vidual union membership information, English, computer science, psychology, and business were the 
four largest employers; history was the next largest department with a relatively high rate of membership 
density. These densities were computer science 33.7%; English 70.5%; history 64.5%; psychology 36.7%, 
and business 8.9%.
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we obtained the list from the union that represents the GSEs. For those de-
partments whose student contacts could not be obtained using the two 
methods above, we contacted graduate program directors and asked them 
to send our survey link to their doctoral students. All program directors who 
were contacted agreed to forward our study link to their students, and also 
provided how many students were in their programs so that we could calcu-
late survey response rates.
In this way we developed a sample of 3,219 graduate students who were 
sent links to our Internet-based survey along with the usual commitments 
around confidentiality and information on the Rutgers University Institu-
tional Review Board that approved this protocol. A total of 798 surveys 
were returned for a response rate of 25%; however, 95 respondents indi-
cated their assistantship status but did not provide data for any other sur-
vey question, while another 8 completed most of the questionnaire items 
but failed to indicate their assistantship status at all (rendering us unable 
to conduct further analysis on them). Thus, we received 695 usable surveys, 
for a final response rate of 22%. About a quarter of respondents reported 
receiving either no support from the university or receiving a fellowship 
(defined as a scholarship that does not require students to perform any 
research or teaching work, other than their own academic research). Be-
cause our focus is on graduate student employees we eliminated these re-
spondents from the analyses presented below, reducing the final sample to 
516. Table 1 presents the basic demographic characteristics of this nar-
rowed sample. The sample is divided roughly equally between union and 
nonunion universities. Business, English, and history are underrepresented 
in terms of the survey population, and computer science and psychology 
are overrepresented. The majority of respondents are serving as teaching 
rather than research assistants, with a small group occupying both roles. 
We have no way of knowing whether these proportions reflect the popula-
tions in the disciplines we are studying. The sample is roughly evenly di-
vided between men and women, and heavily weighted toward the 26 to 30 
year old age group and white. International students constitute 22% of the 
sample.
Measures
GSE union representation was a dichotomous measure indicating whether 
their university is one in which they are covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement (not whether the individual GSE is a dues-paying union mem-
ber). This relates to the industrial relations view that union representation 
changes the internal dynamics of workplaces for all employees whether or 
not they are union members. Student–teacher relationships were measured 
using items adapted from Noe (1988) and Ragins and Cotton (1999). Stu-
dents were presented with statements about their primary advisors (for ex-
ample, “My primary advisor gives me advice on how to build a reputation in 
my academic field”) and were asked to indicate their level of agreement on 
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a 5-point Likert scale for which 1 = “Strongly Disagree” and 5 = “Strongly 
Agree.” Factor analysis was used to develop four scales: Personal Support, 
Professional Support, Teaching-related Academic Freedom, and Academic 
Freedom Climate.8 The analysis produced items that were coherent, had 
face validity, and acceptable levels of internal agreement; items in each scale 
are listed in Table 3. Items in each scale were averaged with equal weights, as 
opposed to being weighted by factor scores.
Economic measures included the natural log of gross annual stipend (de-
fined as the gross annual stipend amount, including any summer support, 
they received for their assistantship) and perceptions of pay adequacy and 
pay fairness. Pay adequacy was measured by asking students: “Do you regard 
the pay and benefits you receive from your assistantship as adequate given 
the amount of work you do?” Response categories ranged from 1 = “No, 
very inadequate” to 4 = “Yes, completely adequate.” Pay fairness was mea-
sured by asking: “Do you regard the pay and benefits you receive from your 
assistantship as fair given the amount of work you do?” Response categories 
ranged from 1 = “No, very unfair” to 5 = “Yes, very fair.” All student respon-
dents (research and teaching assistants, fellows, and those who were self-
supported) were asked the student–teacher relationship and academic 
freedom questions. Only research and teaching assistants were asked the 
economic questions.
Several controls were also added: academic discipline (business, com-
puter science, English, history, psychology); U.S. geographical region 
(Northeast, South, Midwest, West); student category (TA, RA, both a TA 
and an RA); international status; gender; year of study in the current 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics. Graduate Student Employees 
(TAs, RAs, and those who are both).
GSE Union Status (n = 516) Age (n = 462)
 Unionized 49%  25 and under 22%
 Nonunionized 51%  26–30 49%
 31–35 18%
Academic Discipline (n = 516) Older than 35 11%
 Business 17%
Computer Science 20% Gender (n = 460)
 English 22%  Male 47%
 History 17%  Female 53%
 Psychology 25%
Race (n = 451)
Current Assistantship Status (n = 516) White 79%
 TA 62%  Nonwhite 21%
 RA 27%
TA & RA 11% International Students (n = 463) 22%
8The personal support scale had 12 items, ? = .96, and the professional support scale had 6 items, ??= 
.91. Perceptions of teaching-related academic freedom (2 items, ??= .79) and perceptions of the aca-
demic freedom climate within the school and department (2 items, ??= .76) also had acceptable levels of 
internal agreement. Factor analysis details are available upon request.
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graduate program; age; and race.9 We did not develop hypotheses for these 
control variables; some were included because they have been found to be 
correlated with attitudes toward union representation in the past or because 
they are common demographic variables that might affect attitudes toward 
pay fairness and/or adequacy because of differential earning opportunities 
outside academia or that might influence professor–student relationships.
Results
Means, standard deviations, correlations, and scale reliabilities are provided 
in Table 2. Table 3 compares means between unionized and nonunion GSEs 
for the student–teacher relationship, academic freedom, and economic 
variables. Across the board, student employees in unionized universities re-
ported more positive student–teacher relationships, more academic free-
dom, and greater economic well-being than did student employees in 
nonunionized universities; however, most of these differences were not sta-
tistically significant.
In the case of personal support, while there was no significant difference 
in the means, the differences in means for some individual items in the scale 
were significant: unionized GSEs had higher mean ratings on their advisors 
accepting them as competent professionals, serving as a role model to them, 
being someone they wanted to become like, and being effective in his or her 
role. The mean differences for the academic freedom climate scale overall 
were not statistically significant at the conventional .05 level (.05 < p ≤ .10), 
but unionized students were more likely than nonunionized students to re-
port respect for differing opinions in their university.10 Neither differences 
among the scales nor the items in the scale were statistically significant for 
professional support or teaching-related academic freedom. Unionized 
GSEs reported higher stipends, and greater pay fairness and adequacy than 
did nonunion GSEs, all differences that were statistically significant.
We next explored these relationships with a series of OLS regression anal-
yses to determine whether any differences either disappeared or emerged as 
significant once we controlled for other institutional and demographic fac-
tors. Seven models are presented in Table 4, each examining the impact of 
union status on a different dependent variable and controlling for several 
other GSE- and program-related variables. Once program, region, and other 
controls are introduced, unionization becomes a significant positive predic-
tor of both the personal support and professional support dimensions of stu-
dent–teacher relationships. The coefficients presented are standardized.11
9The omitted categories in the regressions were Business, Northeast, TA, Not International, Male, 
26–30 years old, and White.
10In Tables 2 through 4 we identify coefficients as statistically significant at .001, .01, .05, and .10. In the 
narrative, we refer to statistical significance levels of p ≤ .05 as “conventional,” and use the description 
“marginal statistical significance” and similar language to refer to levels of .05 < p ≤ .10.
11As Schwab (2005) indicates, OLS is commonly used for Likert-style scale dependent variables when 
the scales have equal-appearing intervals. Thus, for ease of interpretation, we present OLS results here. 
Because we have multilevel data that violates the OLS assumption of independent observations, however, 
EFFECTS OF UNIONIZATION ON GRADUATE STUDENT EMPLOYEES 501
Ta
bl
e 
2.
 M
ea
n
s,
 S
ta
n
da
rd
 D
ev
ia
ti
on
s,
 C
or
re
la
ti
on
s,
 a
n
d 
Sc
al
e 
R
el
ia
bi
lit
ie
s
Va
ri
ab
le
M
ea
ns
S.
D
.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
 1
O
rg
an
iz
ed
0.
49
0.
50
 2
Pe
rs
on
al
 S
up
po
rt
 (
.9
6)
3.
93
0.
90
–.
07
 3
Pr
of
es
si
on
al
 S
up
po
rt
 (
.9
1)
3.
66
0.
89
–.
06
–.
75
**
 4
A
ca
de
m
ic
 F
re
ed
om
: T
ea
ch
in
g 
(.
79
)
4.
37
0.
95
–.
03
–.
18
**
–.
20
**
 5
A
ca
de
m
ic
 F
re
ed
om
: C
lim
at
e 
(.
76
)
3.
83
0.
92
–.
08
–.
31
**
–.
38
**
 –
.2
8*
*
 6
L
og
 A
n
n
ua
l S
ti
pe
n
d
9.
65
0.
61
–.
12
*
–.
04
–.
07
 –
.0
5
–.
04
 7
Pa
y 
Fa
ir
n
es
s
3.
53
1.
32
–.
10
*
–.
13
**
–.
12
*
 –
.0
4
–.
11
*
–.
07
 8
Pa
y 
A
de
qu
ac
y
2.
41
0.
95
–.
15
**
–.
09
–.
07
 –
.1
1*
–.
12
**
–.
10
*
–.
61
**
 9
Pr
og
ra
m
: B
us
in
es
s
0.
16
0.
37
–0
.0
0
–.
03
–.
08
 –
.0
3
–.
09
–.
03
–.
12
**
–.
01
10
Pr
og
ra
m
: C
om
pu
te
r 
Sc
ie
n
ce
0.
20
0.
40
–.
16
**
–.
08
–.
04
 –
.0
2
–.
09
–.
04
–.
12
**
–.
29
**
–.
22
**
11
Pr
og
ra
m
: E
n
gl
is
h
0.
22
0.
42
–0
.0
0
–.
11
*
0.
00
 –
.0
6
–.
08
–.
05
–.
15
**
–.
15
**
–.
24
**
–.
27
**
12
Pr
og
ra
m
: H
is
to
ry
0.
17
0.
37
–.
04
–.
06
–.
07
 –
.0
1
–.
04
–.
07
–.
12
**
–.
11
*
–.
20
**
–.
23
**
–.
24
**
13
Pr
og
ra
m
: P
sy
ch
ol
og
y
0.
25
0.
43
–.
11
*
–.
11
*
–.
09
*
 –
.0
6
–.
04
–.
04
–.
03
–.
03
–.
25
**
–.
29
**
–.
30
**
–.
26
**
14
R
eg
io
n
: N
or
th
ea
st
0.
31
0.
46
–.
07
–.
07
–.
08
 –
.0
2
–.
07
–.
23
**
–.
11
*
–.
09
*
–.
07
–.
01
–.
21
**
–.
05
–.
10
*
15
R
eg
io
n
: S
ou
th
0.
24
0.
43
–.
03
–.
05
–.
01
 –
.0
7
–.
07
–.
05
–.
08
–.
12
**
–.
11
*
–.
08
–.
05
–.
06
–.
08
16
R
eg
io
n
: M
id
w
es
t
0.
29
0.
46
–.
06
–.
09
–.
10
*
–0
.0
0
0.
00
–.
05
–.
08
–.
02
–.
04
–.
05
–.
17
**
–.
14
**
–.
03
17
R
eg
io
n
: W
es
t
0.
16
0.
37
–.
05
–.
07
–.
03
 –
.0
6
–.
02
–.
17
**
–.
07
–.
05
–.
01
–.
04
0.
00
–.
05
–.
01
18
T
A
0.
62
0.
48
–.
06
–.
01
–.
02
 –
.2
4*
*
–.
15
**
–.
10
–.
12
**
–.
18
**
–.
20
**
–.
29
**
–.
33
**
–.
10
*
–.
03
19
R
A
0.
27
0.
44
–.
12
**
–.
01
–.
01
 –
.2
2*
*
–.
09
–.
12
*
–.
11
*
–.
23
**
–.
03
–.
38
**
–.
29
**
–.
06
–.
04
20
B
ot
h
 a
 T
A
 a
n
d 
R
A
0.
11
0.
31
–.
08
–.
04
–.
02
 –
.0
7
–.
11
*
–.
02
–.
03
–.
05
–.
27
**
–.
08
–.
10
*
–.
07
0.
00
21
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 S
tu
de
n
t
0.
22
0.
42
–.
05
–.
06
–.
08
 –
.1
0*
–.
12
*
–.
05
–.
11
*
–.
11
*
–.
17
**
–.
37
**
–.
20
**
–.
15
**
–.
15
**
22
G
en
de
r
0.
53
0.
50
–.
01
0.
00
–.
08
 –
.0
1
–.
03
–.
01
–.
08
–.
10
*
–.
06
–.
38
**
–.
19
**
–.
02
–.
23
**
23
Y e
ar
 o
f S
tu
dy
3.
52
1.
67
–.
09
*
–.
03
–.
01
 –
.0
5
–.
03
–.
11
*
–.
07
–0
.0
0
–.
10
*
–.
07
–.
05
–.
04
–.
06
24
A
ge
: 2
1 
to
 2
5
0.
22
0.
41
–.
01
–.
04
–.
02
 –
.0
3
–.
04
–.
07
–.
07
–.
11
*
–.
07
–.
13
**
–.
15
**
0.
00
–.
08
25
A
ge
: 2
6 
to
 3
0
0.
49
0.
50
–.
01
–.
05
–.
01
 –
.0
6
–.
02
–.
02
0.
00
–.
04
–.
12
**
–.
05
–.
09
–.
07
–.
13
**
26
A
ge
: 3
1 
to
 3
5
0.
17
0.
38
–.
06
–.
03
–.
01
 –
.0
5
–.
02
–.
08
–.
05
–.
12
**
–.
16
**
–.
08
–.
01
–.
03
–.
10
*
27
A
ge
: 3
6+
0.
11
0.
32
–.
04
–.
02
–.
03
 –
.0
2
–.
10
*
–.
04
–.
03
–.
08
–.
09
–.
02
–.
05
–.
08
–.
18
**
28
R
ac
e
0.
22
0.
41
–.
04
–.
05
–.
04
 –
.0
5
–.
08
–.
01
–.
03
–.
07
–.
16
**
–.
31
**
–.
17
**
–.
16
**
–.
12
*
co
nt
in
ue
d
502 ILRREVIEW
Ta
bl
e 
2.
 C
on
ti
n
ue
d
Va
ri
ab
le
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
 1
O
rg
an
iz
ed
 2
Pe
rs
on
al
 S
up
po
rt
 (
.9
6)
 3
Pr
of
es
si
on
al
 S
up
po
rt
 (
.9
1)
 4
A
ca
de
m
ic
 F
re
ed
om
: T
ea
ch
in
g 
(.
79
)
 5
A
ca
de
m
ic
 F
re
ed
om
: C
lim
at
e 
(.
76
)
 6
L
og
 A
n
n
ua
l S
ti
pe
n
d
 7
Pa
y 
Fa
ir
n
es
s
 8
Pa
y 
A
de
qu
ac
y
 9
Pr
og
ra
m
: B
us
in
es
s
10
Pr
og
ra
m
: C
om
pu
te
r 
Sc
ie
n
ce
11
Pr
og
ra
m
: E
n
gl
is
h
12
Pr
og
ra
m
: H
is
to
ry
13
Pr
og
ra
m
: P
sy
ch
ol
og
y
14
R
eg
io
n
: N
or
th
ea
st
15
R
eg
io
n
: S
ou
th
–.
37
**
16
R
eg
io
n
: M
id
w
es
t
–.
43
**
 –
.3
6*
*
17
R
eg
io
n
: W
es
t
–.
30
**
 –
.2
5*
*
–.
29
**
18
T
A
–.
09
*
 –
.0
2
–.
16
**
–.
11
*
19
R
A
–.
05
 –
.0
2
– .
09
*
–.
08
–.
78
**
20
B
ot
h
 a
 T
A
 a
n
d 
R
A
–.
07
–0
.0
0
–.
12
**
–.
05
–.
45
**
–.
21
**
21
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 S
tu
de
n
t
– .
04
 –
.0
4
–.
03
–.
03
–.
17
**
–.
16
**
–.
03
22
G
en
de
r
– .
07
 –
.0
1
–.
04
–.
03
–.
10
*
–.
09
–.
03
–.
19
**
23
Y e
ar
 o
f S
tu
dy
–.
14
**
 –
.0
8
–.
05
–.
15
**
–.
05
–.
06
–.
02
–.
07
–.
07
24
A
ge
: 2
1 
to
 2
5
–.
12
**
 –
.0
9
–.
06
–.
02
–.
07
–.
13
**
–.
08
0.
00
–.
03
–.
38
**
25
A
ge
: 2
6 
to
 3
0
– .
16
**
 –
.0
7
–.
03
–.
09
–.
13
**
–.
13
**
–.
03
–.
03
–.
02
–.
12
*
–.
52
**
26
A
ge
: 3
1 
to
 3
5
–.
09
 –
.0
4
– .
03
–.
03
–.
07
–.
05
–.
03
–.
03
–.
04
–.
19
**
–.
25
**
–.
45
**
27
A
ge
: 3
6+
–.
02
 –
.0
5
–.
08
–.
13
**
–.
03
–.
04
–.
10
*
0.
00
–.
02
–.
11
*
–.
19
**
–.
35
**
–.
17
**
28
R
ac
e
– .
02
 –
.0
2
–.
01
–.
01
–.
19
**
–.
19
**
–.
02
–.
67
**
–.
13
**
–.
05
–.
03
–.
06
–.
01
.0
3
N
ot
es
: *
 C
or
re
la
ti
on
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
t a
t t
h
e 
0.
05
 le
ve
l; 
**
 a
t t
h
e 
0.
01
 le
ve
l. 
Tw
o-
ta
ile
d 
te
st
s.
 P
ai
r w
is
e 
de
le
ti
on
 o
f m
is
si
n
g 
da
ta
. O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s 
ra
n
ge
 fr
om
 5
16
 to
 3
65
; 
sa
m
pl
e 
si
ze
s 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 c
or
re
la
ti
on
 a
re
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
fr
om
 th
e 
au
th
or
s.
 
T
h
e 
in
te
rn
al
 r
el
ia
bi
lit
ie
s 
of
 s
ca
le
s 
ar
e 
in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
. 
EFFECTS OF UNIONIZATION ON GRADUATE STUDENT EMPLOYEES 503
Table 3. Means Comparison between Graduate Student Employees 
in Union and Nonunion Departments
Variable
Union Nonunion
Mean difference
Level of 
significancen Mean n Mean
Personal Support 225 4.00 248 3.87 n.s.
My primary advisor . . .
“. . . Is someone I can confide in.” 231 3.82 252 3.71 n.s
“. . . Provides support and encouragement to me.” 231 4.07 252 3.96 n.s
“. . . Is someone I can trust.” 231 4.13 252 4.06 n.s
“. . . Thinks highly of me.” 231 4.01 252 3.85 †
“. . . Accepts me as a competent professional.” 231 3.99 252 3.79 *
“. . . Serves as a role model for me.” 231 4.03 251 3.84 *
“. . . Represents someone I want to become like.” 230 3.74 251 3.52 *
“. . . Is someone I am satisfied with.” 231 4.03 252 3.88 n.s
“. . . Fails to meet my needs.” (reverse-coded) 230 3.96 252 3.89 n.s
“. . . Disappoints me.” (reverse-coded) 227 4.04 251 3.93 n.s
“. . . Has been effective in his/her role as advisor.” 229 3.97 251 3.76 *
“I can freely exchange ideas with my primary advisor.” 234 4.24 253 4.10 n.s
Professional Support 228 3.71 251 3.60 n.s
My primary advisor . . . 
“. . . Uses his/her influence to support my profes- 
   sional development in my academic field.” 231 3.86 251 3.71 n.s
“. . . Helps me learn about the academic profession.” 231 3.97 251 3.82 n.s
“. . . Gives me advice on how to build a reputation in 
   my academic field.” 231 3.77 251 3.70 n.s
“. . . Suggests specific strategies for achieving my 
   career aspirations.” 231 3.65 251 3.63 n.s
“. . . Protects me from those who may be out to 
   hinder my success.” 229 3.50 251 3.38 n.s
“. . . Brings my accomplishments to the attention of 
influential people in my academic field.” 230 3.53 251 3.37 n.s
Teaching-Related Academic Freedom 225 4.35 246 4.40 n.s
“As long as I restrict myself to the subject matter of the 
course, I am free to choose what I say or discuss 
with students in my courses.” 225 4.38 246 4.37 n.s
“As long as I restrict myself to the subject matter of the 
course, I am free to choose how I will teach the 
   material in my course.” 225 4.31 246 4.43 n.s
Academic Freedom Climate 224 3.91 245 3.76 †
“There is respect for differing opinions in my program 
   or department.” 224 3.88 245 3.78 n.s
“There is respect for differing opinions in the university.” 225 3.94 246 3.73 *
Gross Annual Stipend (in U.S. dollars) 182 18,312 221 15,867 ***
Pay Fairness 250 3.67 264 3.39 *
Pay Adequacy 250 2.55 263 2.28 ***
Notes: All student–teacher relationship, academic freedom items, and pay fairness were measured using 
a 5-point Likert scale, for which 5 indicates a positive response (i.e., greater personal support, more aca-
demic freedom, or fairer pay and benefits). Pay adequacy was measured using a 4-point Likert scale, for 
which 4 indicates a high level of adequacy.
†Statistically significant at p ≤ .10; * at p ≤ .05; ** at p ≤ .01; *** at p ≤ .001
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Table 4. Unionized vs. Nonunionized Graduate Student Employee Outcomes
Student–Teacher
Relationships Academic Freedom Economic Issues
Personal
support
(n = 429)
Professional 
support
(n = 435)
Teaching- 
related
(n = 439)
Climate
(n = 437)
Annual
stipend
(n = 358)
Pay
adequacy
(n = 439)
Pay
fairness
(n = 440)
Independent Variable
ORGANIZED: Whether student’s 0.132** 0.101* –0.024 0.082† 0.098† 0.106* 0.096*
 university is unionized (1 = yes) [0.007] [0.043] [0.625] [0.098] [0.071] [0.024] [0.047]
Control Variables
Academic Discipline
 PROGRAMB: Business — — — — — — —
— — — — — — —
 PROGRAMC: –0.181** –0.138* –0.055 –0.010 0.030 0.163* –0.012
 Computer Science [0.011] [0.049] [0.431] [0.892] [0.692] [0.015] [0.867]
 PROGRAME: English 0.092 –0.049 0.041 –0.115 –0.132 –0.130† –0.189**
[0.215] [0.516] [0.579] [0.130] [0.109] [0.066] [0.010]
 PROGRAMH: History 0.103 0.061 0.013 –0.059 –0.086 –0.086 –0.124†
[0.129] [0.365] [0.846] [0.388] [0.239] [0.180] [0.062]
 PROGRAMP: Psychology –0.089 –0.097 0.055 –0.061 0.023 –0.056 –0.019
[0.223] [0.193] [0.450] [0.415] [0.776] [0.416] [0.793]
U.S. Geographical Region
 NORTHEAST — — — — — — —
— — — — — — —
 SOUTH –0.032 –0.059 0.053 –0.086 –0.219*** –0.133* –0.188***
[0.579] [0.311] [0.355] [0.141] [0.001] [0.015] [0.001]
 MIDWEST –0.051 –0.098† –0.026 –0.044 –0.218*** –0.080 –0.174**
[0.382] [0.098] [0.659] [0.460] [0.001] [0.151] [0.003]
 WEST 0.072 0.010 –0.01 –0.068 –0.274*** 0.034 –0.016
[0.197] [0.856] [0.850] [0.225] [0.000] [0.525] [0.768]
continued
The positive impact of unionization on perceptions of both pay adequacy 
and pay fairness holds up in these regressions.12 Unionization is no longer a 
significant determinant of the annual stipend. Unionization remains unre-
lated to teaching-related academic freedom in the regression and, as in the 
means analysis, it does not predict academic freedom climate (p > .05). In-
teresting to note is that the same models run for the full sample, including 
we also ran models for random effects at the university-program level using a procedure that controls for 
correlated errors within programs within universities. As one would expect, the standard errors in these 
equations were slightly larger but most of the coefficients that were statistically significant remained so. 
The exceptions were for pay adequacy and pay fairness; in both of these equations the union variable lost 
significance. Since GSE unions negotiate one collective bargaining agreement per university, we would 
argue that the loss of significance for these latter variables using the multilevel procedures is to be ex-
pected and does not vitiate the idea that unions increase compensation. Results for these models are 
available upon request.
12To ensure the accuracy of our findings for the two limited categorical dependent variables—pay fair-
ness and pay adequacy—ordered logistic regressions were estimated for these two. Results were very 
similar with regard to the union representation variable; however, only pay adequacy met the “parallel 
lines” assumption of ordered logit, so we also ran multinomial logit models. Again, those who were not 
represented were less likely to report pay fairness and pay adequacy all around, but the multinomial 
model revealed that the effect was statistically significant for the highest “yes, completely fair” and the 
“yes, completely adequate” categories alone. Results for these models are available upon request.
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fellows and self-supported students, produce weaker results overall.13 This 
suggests the main impact of unionization is on employees, rather than the 
overall climate for graduate students.
Given the presence of a small number of high pair-wise correlations in 
Table 2, which presents the possibility of multicollinearity problems in the 
regression analyses, we assessed the variance inflation factor (VIF) of each 
predictor variable within each regression. Using accepted VIF rules of 
thumb (O’Brien 2007) whereby a VIF of 10 is an indication of excessive or 
serious multicollinearity, the independent variables across all seven models 
displayed VIFs smaller than three, with most smaller than two. This satisfies 
recent calls for even more conservative VIFs of smaller than four to rule out 
the possibility for multicollinearity problems (O’Brien 2007), and, together 
Table 4. Continued
Student–Teacher
Relationships Academic Freedom Economic Issues
Personal
support
(n = 429)
Professional 
support
(n = 435)
Teaching- 
related
(n = 439)
Climate
(n = 437)
Annual
stipend
(n = 358)
Pay
adequacy
(n = 439)
Pay
fairness
(n = 440)
Student Category
 TA — — — — — — —
— — — — — — —
 RA 0.061 0.023 0.288*** 0.063 0.062 0.117* 0.064
[0.267] [0.677] [0.000] [0.255] [0.310] [0.025] [0.240]
 TARA 0.068 0.037 0.148** 0.091† –0.016 0.034 0.052
[0.188] [0.482] [0.004] [0.082] [0.784] [0.487] [0.309]
ABROAD: Whether student is an 0.197** 0.190** –0.086 0.073 –0.142† –0.016 0.061
 international student (1 = yes) [0.004] [0.005] [0.197] [0.281] [0.058] [0.804] [0.355]
GENDER (1 = female) –0.054 –0.099† –0.051 0.016 –0.012 –0.027 –0.060
[0.309] [0.063] [0.328] [0.772] [0.839] [0.595] [0.245]
YROFSTDY: Student’s year in current –0.047 –0.005 0.036 –0.057 –0.005 0.047 –0.065
 PhD program (continuous, 0-9+) [0.390] [0.921] [0.499] [0.294] [0.930] [0.356] [0.221]
Age
 AGECAT2125:  21 to 25 years old –0.020 –0.018 0.053 –0.065 –0.047 0.075 0.047
[0.716] [0.744] [0.323] [0.238] [0.424] [0.150] [0.382]
 AGECAT2630: 26 to 30 years old — — — — — — —
— — — — — — —
 AGECAT3135: 31 to 35 years old –0.063 –0.001 0.041 –0.021 0.108† –0.113* –0.016
[0.234] [0.986] [0.424] [0.693] [0.058] [0.023] [0.749]
 AGECAT36: Older than 35 –0.056 –0.012 0.007 0.071 0.070 –0.101* –0.015
[0.281] [0.817] [0.893] [0.173] [0.214] [0.040] [0.772]
RACE (1 = nonwhite) –0.115† –0.160* –0.025 –0.013 0.037 –0.034 –0.096
[0.078] [0.014] [0.669] [0.837] [0.594] [0.585] [0.132]
Constant 3.976*** 3.813*** 4.112*** 4.002*** 9.890*** 2.416*** 4.139***
F-value 2.611*** 1.933* 2.648*** 1.632* 2.626*** 5.072*** 3.003***
R2 0.097 0.073 0.096 0.062 0.116 0.170 0.108
Adjusted R2 0.060 0.035 0.060 0.024 0.072 0.136 0.072
† Statistically significant at p ≤ .10; * at p ≤ .05; ** at p ≤ .01; *** at p ≤ .001. P-values are in brackets. Standard errors are 
available upon request.
13This is true except for the pay variables for which there obviously is no data for nonemployees.
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with the fact that results from our alternate specifications—including the 
random effects and ordinal and multinomial logit models—did not differ 
substantially from the OLS results shown in Table 4, provide further evi-
dence that our regression estimates are not marred by excessive multicol-
linearity.
Clear evidence is not observed in our data for the assertions that GSE 
representation harms the faculty–student relationship or reduces aca-
demic freedom. But does that mean these long-standing legal assertions 
are disproved by our study? To answer that question, we conducted a 
post hoc power analysis for each model to determine whether our sam-
ple sizes were sufficiently large to yield stable, reliable, and unbiased es-
timates (Shen, Kiger, Davies, Rasch, Simon, and Ones 2011).14 Compared 
with “generally adequate” statistical power level suggestions of 0.80 
(Shen et al. 2011: 1057), our models yielded powers of 0.99, 0.97, 1.0, 
0.93, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, respectively. Our sample had sufficient power, that is, 
was large enough, to detect statistically significant effects if they in fact 
existed.
Several of our control variables were also statistically significant at con-
ventional (p ≤ .05) or marginal levels (.05 < p ≤ .10). Computer science stu-
dents reported lower levels of personal support (compared with business 
students, who were the omitted category), as did nonwhites. International 
GSEs reported higher levels of personal support. GSEs who were in com-
puter science, in the Midwest (compared with students in the Northeast, 
who were the omitted category), female, and nonwhite reported lower lev-
els of professional support, while international students reported greater 
levels of professional support from their primary advisors.
In terms of teaching-related academic freedom, compared with TAs (the 
omitted category), students who were RAs or both an RA and a TA simulta-
neously reported greater academic freedom, differences with practical sig-
nificance since actual TAs are likely to know more about teaching conditions 
than RAs. Regarding academic freedom climate within the program and 
university, GSEs who were simultaneously TAs and RAs reported greater 
freedom. Students in the South, Midwest, and West reported lower annual 
stipends than students in the Northeast, as did international students. Fur-
ther, students in the 31 to 35 age range category reported higher annual 
stipends than those in the 26 to 30 age range, the holdout category. In terms 
of pay adequacy, computer science students and RAs reported greater ade-
quacy, while students in English departments, in the South, and older than 
30 years felt their pay was less adequate. Students in English and history de-
partments, and students in the South and Midwest, reported lower percep-
tions of pay fairness. While we think the very different conditions of work 
likely explain differences between TAs and RAs, also possible is that differ-
ent types of students (for instance, students of differing types of ability) se-
lect into these categories.
14We used SPSS SamplePower 3.0.
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Discussion, Limitations, and Conclusion
In this article, we examine the impact of graduate student employee union-
ization on three sets of outcomes: faculty–student relationships, academic 
freedom, and pay. While the NLRB in the Brown decision and certain con-
ceptualizations of the employment relationship under collective bargaining 
emphasize the potential for a negative impact on faculty–student relation-
ships, our results support other theoretical traditions that suggest unioniza-
tion might have no impact or even a positive impact on those relationships. 
In the unionized departments we surveyed, students reported better per-
sonal and professional support relationships with their primary advisors 
than were reported by their nonunion counterparts. Our data do not  permit 
us to conclude with certainty the reason for the positive impact, although 
our results accord with what would be predicted by internal labor market 
theory. It could be that GSE unions, either directly or through creating pres-
sures that encourage management to rationalize practices, encourage stron-
ger mentoring by faculty advisors. Alternatively, as Gross argues, perhaps 
GSE unions strengthen the relationship between students and faculty advi-
sors by pushing potential employment-related conflicts up to the university 
bureaucracy. Either way, we find no support for the NLRB’s contention in 
the Brown decision that union representation would harm the faculty– 
student relationship.
Also contrary to the Board in Brown, ample reason exists to think that 
unionization might actually strengthen the academic freedom of graduate 
students; however, we found only scant evidence of a positive effect. No evi-
dence was observed for stronger teaching-related academic freedom for stu-
dents in unionized settings; perhaps this is not an issue that GSE unions have 
thus far taken on. We did find some support, albeit weak, for a positive impact 
of unionization on the overall climate of academic freedom (both departmen-
tal and university-wide). Again, no support was found for the NLRB’s conten-
tion in Brown that GSE unionization would diminish academic freedom.
Despite the NLRB’s focus on the potential negative effects on academic 
outcomes, graduate students themselves have likely been more concerned 
with the basic terms and conditions of employment. We find some support 
for the notion that unionization improves the economic terms of graduate 
student employment in the form of annual stipends as well as perceptions of 
pay fairness and adequacy. It might also be added that pay adequacy should be 
linked with improved educational outcomes—students who are receiving ad-
equate pay for their employment are less likely to have additional outside em-
ployment, which could interfere with their ability to focus on their degree.15
While our results undermine the reasoning used by the majority in the 
Brown decision, we should note some important caveats related to differences 
in the public-sector universities we studied and the private sector where the 
NLRB has jurisdiction. First, while private-sector employees including GSEs 
15Compared with GSEs who reported their stipend as “completely adequate,” GSEs who reported their 
stipend as “very inadequate” (p ≤ .001) or “somewhat inadequate” (p ≤ .01) were more likely to have 
other paid employment in addition to their teaching or research assistantship.
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have a right to strike, many public-sector jurisdictions prohibit or otherwise 
limit strikes, which in theory could reduce the likelihood of adversarial rela-
tions developing between faculty and GSEs. However, GSE strikes have oc-
curred in some public-sector universities (at the University of Illinois and 
University of California-Berkeley, for example), so the impact of cross-state 
differences in strike law or behavior in the public sector is an issue worth 
further empirical examination.16 Second, the scope of bargaining is often 
more constrained in the public sector than in the private sector, limiting the 
scope of the collective bargaining agreement at these universities. Finally, 
given the barriers faculty unionization faces in the private sector (the gen-
eral legal prohibition of faculty unionization based on the assumption of 
the faculty’s managerial status), a more likely scenario is that the faculty in 
public universities are themselves unionized, which might also ameliorate 
any potential negative impact of GSE unionization. In fact, two of the four 
unionized universities we studied also had unionized faculty; in both cases 
the faculty and graduate students are represented by the same or an affili-
ated labor organization. The impact of all these differences, however, is 
mere supposition. Like graduate student unionization itself, the nuances of 
these differing contexts deserve empirical investigation before they are given 
weight in any legal decisions. Also important to note is that, largely as a result 
of the NLRB’s Brown decision, studying GSE unionization in the private sector 
in the United States is not possible because, to the best of our knowledge, there 
are no private research universities with union-represented GSEs.
Several other important limitations might well serve as a basis for future 
research. The first is our approach as it relates to the theoretical relation-
ships among GSE unionization and student outcomes. Our primary aim was 
to put to test decades of NLRB “theory” about the potentially harmful con-
sequences of GSE collective bargaining. While we map several theoretical 
perspectives from the industrial relations tradition onto the court’s hereto-
fore untested assertions, our relatively low R-square values suggest that 
 additional factors are at work between student unionization and student–
teacher relationships, academic freedom, and pay issues. Future researchers 
might consider using constructs and theories from the organizational be-
havior and social psychology domains, such as personality, mentor–protégé 
relations, and student motivation and abilities, to paint a more complete 
picture of this complex relationship.17
Another limitation is the lack of a traditional laboratory science depart-
ment, although both computer science and psychology likely share some 
characteristics with those departments: PhD students are placed in laborato-
ries where they work as part of a specific team and under a specific grant. 
Some of the most troubling questions about the potential impact of union 
16Newspaper coverage of the 2009 GSE strike at the University of Illinois can be accessed at http://
articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-11-17/news/0911160398_1_graduate-student-instructors-graduate-em 
ployees-organization. A University of California-Berkeley press release concerning the 1996 strike of 
GSEs at that campus can be retrieved from http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/96legacy/
agse.html.
17Thank you to one of the anonymous referees for this suggestion.
EFFECTS OF UNIONIZATION ON GRADUATE STUDENT EMPLOYEES 509
representation of GSEs have concerned RAs in the physical and biological 
sciences. Future research should look more at those settings. We recognize 
that our empirical evidence is likely not the final word on the consequences 
of union representation for GSEs. At the same time, the fact that our results 
parallel those of Hewitt (2000), who collected data from faculty, begins to 
suggest a consistent picture. Hewitt found that almost all (88%) of faculty 
agreed that graduate student collective bargaining did not inhibit the men-
toring relationships they had with graduate students; the evidence from 
graduate students themselves supports the same conclusion. Even larger 
proportions of faculty believe GSE unionization did not inhibit their ability 
to advise or instruct graduate students and did not inhibit the free exchange 
of ideas. Similarly, represented graduate students report equal or better lev-
els of academic freedom as do those who are not represented.
An additional useful area for future research would be why some graduate 
student employees (and not others) unionize, and once unionized, what they 
want from representation. Are their objectives largely economic? Theory sug-
gests that it makes no sense for GSE unions to pursue policies that alienate grad-
uate students from their faculty mentors. Further development of the theory of 
GSE bargaining priorities needs to go hand in hand with empirical research.
We encourage the NLRB, and the courts themselves, to look at the best 
evidence available on the actual consequences of representation, from the 
public sector in the United States, or even perhaps from the private sector 
in other nations. Legal arguments made in the absence of empirical evi-
dence are deeply troubling, especially when they lead to the deprivation of 
labor rights.
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